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DeFonte: Technology

CASE SUMMARY

TECHNOLOGY
KONOP v. HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC.
2001 U.S. APP. LEXIS 191. (9TH CIR. JAN 8,
2001)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc.,l the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the unauthorized access of the content of a secure website is a violation of
the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act. 2 This is
the first case to determine whether unauthorized accessing of
a secure private website is a violation of the Wiretap Act. 3
This decision is contrary to an earlier decision by the Fifth
Circuit in United. States v. Turk, 4 which held that the Wiretap
Act required contemporaneous transmission and acquisition of
the communication. 5
1 See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191 (9th Cir. Jan 8,
2001). The appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of
California was argued and submitted on June 8, 2000 before Circuit Judges Robert
Boochever, Steven Reinhart, and Richard A. Daez. The decision was filed on January
8, 2001. Boochever authored the opinion.
2 See id. at *25.
3 See id. at *7.
4 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976).
5 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *8.
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that the scope of protection
under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act
depends on the degree of intrusion, not on whether the communication is in transit or storage. 6 Subsequently, content on
a secure website is an "electronic communication" within the
meaning of the Acts and is therefore protected from unlawful
interception. 7 The Ninth Circuit also concluded that defendant's unlawful interception of the content on plaintiff's secure
website, followed by its disclosure to an opposing union faction and engagement in coercion and intimidation, raised a
triable issue of fact, and remanded Konop's claims under the
Railway labor Act. 8
II.

FACTS

Robert Konop ("Konop"), a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc. ("Hawaiian"), established a website on which he posted
bulletins criticizing Hawaiian, its officers, and the Air Line
Pilots Association ("ALPA") for negotiating labor concessions. 9
Konop encouraged other pilots to consider alternate union
representation because ALPA supported a proposal by Hawaiian for wage concessions. lo Access to Konop's website was limited to certain Hawaiian employees who were required to log
on with a user name and password provided by Konop.ll
Before issuing a password to potential viewers, Konop also required each viewer to agree not to disclose the contents of Konop's website. 12
In December 1995, James Davis, Vice-President of Hawaiian ("Davis") approached a Hawaiian pilot, Gene Wong
("Wong"), seeking permission to use Wong's name to access
Konop's website. 13 With Wong's permission Davis used Wong's
See id. at *12.
See id. at *25.
8 See id. at *42-43.
9 See id.· at *2.
10 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *30.
11 See id. at *3. Hawaiian managers and union representatives were denied access to Konop's website. See id.
12 See id. Before obtaining a password, potential users of Konop's website were
required to click a button which indicated agreement to the terms of use, which included a non-disclosure clause. See id.
13 See id.
6

7
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name to log on and view Konop's website.1 4 Consequently,
when Davis logged onto Konop's website he indicated that he
agreed to the website's terms and conditions. 15
Shortly thereafter, Konop received a call from Reno
Morella ("Morella"), the union chairman of ALPA, regarding
the contents of Konop's website. 16 Morella informed Konop
that Bruce Nobles ("Nobles"), president of Hawaiian, had
called him because he was distressed by the contents of Konop's websiteY Based on his conversation with Morella, Konop believed that Nobles had obtained access to his website
and was now threatening to sue Konop for defamation. 18
As a result, Konop took his website down for the rest of
the day.19 However, he restored the website the next day, still
uncertain of how Nobles had acquired access to his website. 20
After examining his access logs, Konop learned that Davis
had logged on as Wong. 21 Meanwhile, Davis had obtained permission from another pilot, James Gardner ("Gardner"), to log
on using his name. 22 From December 1995 through April 1,
1996, Konop records indicated over twenty log-ins by Davis,
as Wong, and at least fourteen more as Gardner.23

III.

PROCEDURE

Konop filed suit against Hawaiian at the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging
violation of the Railway Labor Act,24 the Wiretap Act,25 and
14 See id. at*3. Wong had never used the site, and had never agreed to Konop's
terms of use or the terms of Konop's non-disclosure agreement. See id.
15 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *3. The Ninth Circuit presumed that
Davis indicated consent to Konop's terms of use for the website by clicking a button.
See id.
16 See id.
17 See id. According to Morella, Nobles was upset by Konop's allegations of fraud,
and by other criticisms contained in Konop's website. See id.
18 See id. at *4.
19 See id.
20 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *4.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id. at *4.
24 See 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (2000).
25 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000).
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the Stored Communications Act;26 all of which arose from Davis' viewing of Konop's website. 27 In addition, Konop brought
claims against Hawaiian based on his allegation that Hawaiian imposed a medical coverage suspension in retaliation to
his opposition to proposed labor concessions. 28 The district
court granted summary judgment to Hawaiian on all but the
last claim. 29 However, after a short bench trial, the district
court entered judgment against Konop for his claim of retaliatory suspension. 30
Subsequently, Konop appealed the summary judgment
and the judgment entered against him on his retaliatory suspension claim to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 31 Konop argued that Davis accessed his website
under false pretenses and thus violated both the Wiretap Act
and the Stored Communications Act. 32 In addition, Konop argued that Hawaiian violated the Railway Labor Act by its unauthorized access to and disclosure of the content on his website. 33 On January 8, 2001, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court's summary judgment concerning
Konop's claims under the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Railway Labor Act. 34 However, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment against
Konop on his claim of retaliatory suspension. 35

IV.

NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

A. WIRETAP ACT AND STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT CLAIMS

Protection against eavesdropping through modern electronic communications is governed by the Wiretap Act and
the Stored Communications Act. 36 The Wiretap Act prohibits
See id. §§ 2701-2710.
See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *4. Konop also alleged numerous state
law tort claims. See id.
26 See id.
29 See id. at *5.
30 See id.
31 See id. at *1.
32 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *5.
33 See id.
34 See id. at *2.
35 See id.
38 See id. at *6.
26

27
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unauthorized "interception" of "electronic communications."37
The Stored Communications Act prohibits unauthorized "access" to a "facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided."38 Since the civil damages differ substantially between the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act,39 the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether Davis'
use of Konop's website under false pretenses was an unauthorized interception, or access, or both. 40 This issue was one of
first impression for the Ninth CircuitY
1. Interpretation of the Wiretap Act

First, the Ninth Circuit focused on the Wiretap Act's definition of interception. 42 In its original form, the Wiretap Act
prohibited any person from "willfully intercept[ing], endeavor[ing] to intercept, or procur[ing] any other person to intercept, any wire or oral communication . . . ."43 The Wiretap
Act defined "wire communication" as "any communication
made ... through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection."44 An "oral communication" was "any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception . . . ."45 "Intercept"
meant "the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device."46
In an earlier Fifth Circuit case, United States u. Turk,47
the term "intercept" had received a narrow construction. 48 In
Turk, the Fifth Circuit determined whether an interception of
See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511).
See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701).
39 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2250 with 18 U.S.C. § 2707. Civil penalties are greater
under the Wiretap Act than under the Stored Communications Act. See Konop, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6.
40 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *6-7.
41 See id. at *7.
42 See id.
43 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511(a) (West 1970) (amended 1986).
44 [d. § 2510 (1).
45 [d. § 2510 (2).
46 [d. § 2510 (4).
47 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976).
48 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *8.
37

38
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a communication included playing back a tape-recorded conversation which had been recorded by a third party.49 The
Fifth Circuit held that it did not and that no interception had
occurred, because the logic and policy of the Wiretap Act required contemporaneous transmission and acquisition of the
communication. 50
Whether an interception requires transmission and acquisition to be contemporaneous was vital to analyzing Konop's
claim. 51 Under the original Wiretap Act, as interpreted by
Turk, there could never be an "interception" from the
downloading of the information stored on web servers. 52

2. Scope of Protection Under the Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act
To determine whether Turk's contemporaneity requirement was persuasive dicta, the Ninth Circuit discussed the
subsequent amendments to the Wiretap Act by the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").53 Title I of the ECPA
amended the Wiretap Act by prohibiting unauthorized "interception" of "electronic communications."54 Title II of the ECPA
created the Stored Communications Act, prohibiting unauthorized "access" to "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided."55
Of importance was the expansion of the definition of
"wired communication."56 The definition was expanded to include "any electronic storage of such communication."57 Additionally, the amended ECPA created exceptions to the catchall category of "electronic communication."58 These included
"any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data,
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical
4. See Turk, 526 F.2d at 658.
50

51
52

53
54

55

56
57

58

See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *8.
See id. at *9.
See id.
See id.
18 U.S.C.§ 2511.
Id. at § 2701.
See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *10.
See id.
See id.
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system.
"59
The Ninth Circuit then determined whether the amended
definition of "intercept" under the Wiretap Act squared with
weaker protection afforded under the Stored Communications
Act. 60 The Ninth Circuit referred to its holding in United
States v. Smith,61 where the issue was whether stored communications were protected under the Wiretap Act. 62
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit's
definition of "intercept" in Turk because it was difficult to
"square" with the Wiretap Act's new definition of "wire communications."63 The amended definition included "stored communications," which rendered the Turk requirement of contemporaneity meaningless. 64 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the term "intercept" under the Wiretap Act
and "access" under the Stored Communications Act must be
conceptually and qualitatively different.65
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explained that intercept
means acquiring the contents of a communication, while access merely involves being in a position to acquire the contents of a communication. 66 Hence, the scope of protection
under the Acts depends on the degree of intrusion, not on
whether the communication is in transit or storage. 67 Applying Smith's definition of "interception" to electronic communication would render the unauthorized acquisition of the contents of a secure website an interception, and as such a
violation of the Wiretap Act. 68
59

[d.

See id.
155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1988).
62 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *10.
63 See id. at *11.
64 See id.
65 See id. at *12. The Fifth Circuit's definition of interception required contemporaneous transmission and acquisition of a wire communication. See Turk, 526 F.2d at
658.
66 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *12.
67 See id.
68 See id. at *12-13. In Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service, the
Fifth Circuit, the only court to have decided this issue, concluded that Congress intended the ECPA to carry forward Turk's requirement of contemporaneity. See id. (citing Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Servo 26 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.
1994)). Therefore, an unauthorized acquisition of another person's secure website content would not be an "interception" because the content acquired was a "stored com60

61
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3. Acquisition Need Not Be Contemporaneous
Transmission

With

The Ninth Circuit then analyzed whether "intercept" has
the same meaning when applied to either wire or electronic
communications. 69 The Ninth Circuit first noted that the
Wiretap Act provides only one definition of "intercept," and
that definition does not expressly include Turk's requirement
of contemporaneity.70 In addition, the Turk contemporaneity
requirement is not included in the ECPA's legislative history,
nor has it been widely adopted by other circuit courts.71
Therefore, Congress did not intend to require Turk's "contemporaneity" requirement into its amended definition of
intercept. 72

4. Exceptions
Under the Wiretap Act, not all viewing of a website constitutes in an unlawful interception. 73 For example, accessing
an electronic communication readily available to the general
munication." See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *13. In reaching its decision,
the Fifth Circuit had relied on the exclusion of "stored communication" within the
definition of protected "electronic communications." See id. However, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the Fifth Circuit that Congress intended to have one definition of "intercept" govern "wire communications," while another definition of "intercept" governed "electronic communications." See id. Although the definition of
"electronic communications" does not expressly include stored communications, the
Ninth Circuit determined that protection was implied because electronic communication cannot be successfully completed otherwise. See id. at *15 (citing Tatsuya
Akamine, Proposal for a Fair Statutory Interpretation: Email Stored in a Secure Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. &
Pol'y, 550-51 (1999».
69 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *12-13.
70 "Intercept" means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device. See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14. (citing 18 US.C. §
2510(4».
71 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14. The Ninth Circuit found only one
apparent adoption the Turk definition of "intercept" by a circuit court prior to the
passing of the ECPA. See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14 (noting United
States v. Shields, 675 F.2d 1152, 1156 (11thCir. 1982».
72 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *14.
73 See id. at *20.
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public is not a violation. 74 Additionally, obtaining appropriate
consent does not constitute a violation. 75
The Ninth Circuit readily discounted the classification of
Konop's website as being available to the general public. 76 Konop required user names and passwords to restrict access to
his website. 77 Therefore, absent consent, Davis' access of Konop's website was a violation of the Wiretap Act. 78
The Ninth Circuit then determined whether Davis had
obtained consent to access Konop's website. 79 The Wiretap Act
provides that consent must be given by "one of the parties to
the communication."80 A party to a communication is defined
as "a person or group participating in an action or affair."81
Hawaiian claimed that Wong's consent, as an authorized
user of Konop's website, entitled Davis to view the contents of
the website. 82 However, only pilots who identified themselves,
created passwords, and agreed to the website's terms in return for access to the Konop website were parties to an agreement with Konop.83 Wong did not identify himself, create a
password, or agree to the website's terms, and therefore was
not party to an agreement with Konop.84 As Konop never gave
Wong permission to use the website, Wong could not have
given Davis his consent. 85
Hawaiian argued that Konop gave implied consent to Davis by failing to disable Wong and Gardner's access to the
74 "It shall not unlawful. .. for any person ... to intercept or access an electronic
communication made through an electronic communication system that is so configured that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
75 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21.
76 See id. at *20-21.
77 See id. at *21.
78 See id.
79 See id. at *21-25.
60 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d).
81 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21-22 (citing Merman Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1322 <Delux ed. 1987)).
82 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *21. In the alternative, Hawaiian
claimed that Davis later received consent from Gardner. See id. at *23. Nevertheless,
Gardner's consent did not give Davis prior consent that could excuse Davis' previous
access of the website as "Wong." See id.
83 See id. at *23.
84 See id.
85 See id. at *23.
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website after discovering Davis' conduct. 86 In United States u.
Van Poyck,87 the Ninth Circuit held that consent "may be 'implied in fact' from surrounding circumstances indicating that
the [party] knowingly agreed to the surveillance."88 While Konop suspected that Hawaiian management had accessed his
website, he did not know how or by whom until months
later.89 The Ninth Circuit determined that because these facts
were open to interpretation, this issue should have been decided by the finder of fact and not on summary judgment.90
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that any implied
consent Davis might have received had not been given prior
to Davis' first visit to Konop'S website. 91

5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit held that information
contained on secure web sites is an "electronic communication"
which is protected from "unauthorized interception under the
Wiretap Act."92 Further, Konop had successfully raised material issues of fact concerning whether Davis had consent to
view Konop's website, and whether Davis had violated the
Stored Communications Act by acquiring unauthorized access. 93 Therefore, the district court had erred in granting summary judgment for Hawaiian on Konop's claims under the
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act. 94
See id. at *24-25.
87 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996).
88 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *24 (quoting Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at
292). The Ninth Circuit also considered a broader definition of "parties to a communication" which included intended, as well as actual, recipients of the communication.
See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191 at *22. However, the additional steps required
to gain access to Konop's website indicate that not all Hawaiian pilots were intended
parties. See id. at *23. As Wong never took these steps, he was merely a potential recipient and thus not an intended recipient of Konop's website content. See id. at *2223.
89 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *24-25.
90 See id. at *25.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
86

94

See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *25.
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RAILWAY LABOR ACT CLAIM

The second issue the Ninth Circuit considered was
whether Hawaiian had violated the Railway Labor Act
("RLA").95 The RLA prohibits "interference, influence, or coercion by either party over the designation or representatives by
the other."96 The RLA also prohibits any carrier from interfering in any way with the organization of its employees. 97 Konop claimed Hawaiian violated the RLA by (1) interfering
with Konop's organizing efforts through Davis' unauthorized
access of Konop's website, (2) wrongfully assisting the ALPA
by disclosing the contents of his website, and (3) engaging in
coercion and intimidation by threatening to file suit against
Konop based on the content of his website. 98 Before analyzing
Konop's allegations, the Ninth Circuit determined whether
the district court had erred in dismissing Konop's RLA claims
on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims. 99

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over RLA
disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements
("CBA") which are considered "minor" claims which must be
brought to ,arbitration. lOo However, claims that arise under
statutory provisions are not "minor" claims, and may be
brought directly in district court.lOl The Ninth Circuit deterSee id. at *26.
45 US.C. § 152.
97 See id.
98 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *26.
99 See id. at *27.
100 See id. at *27. The RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for "the
prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes, major and minor. See 45
US.C. §151(a). Major disputes are those concerning rates of pay and rules or working, and they relate to 'the formation of, or attempt to secure, collective bargaining
agreements. See Conrail u. Railway Labor Executiues Ass'n, 491 US. 299, 302 (1989)
quoting Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. u. Burley, 325 US. 711, 723 (1945». "Minor" disputes,
"grow out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." 45 US.C. §151(a). Minor disputes involve "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement
in a particular fact situation." See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. u. Norris, 512 US. 246,
252-53, 256 (1994).
101 See Konop, 2001 US. App. Lexis 191, at *28. (citing Fennessy u. Southwest
Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362 (9th Cir. 1996».
95
96
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mined that "Konop had presented specific statutory claims
based on violations of the RLA."1D2 Konop's RLA claims were
not subject to arbitration, and hence are within the court's
jurisdiction. 103

2. Protected Activity
Once the issue 'of jurisdiction had been resolved, the
Ninth Circuit addressed Hawaiian's argument that it had not
interfered with any protected organizing activity.l04 It contended that Konop posted articles which seriously criticized
Hawaiian's managers and their wage concession proposals on
his website. l05 These articles also suggested an alternative
union representation to the current ALPA representation. 106
Labor organizing activity in publications loses protection if
the publication contains defamatory statements. 107
Hawaiian claimed that Konop's statements were defamatory and known to be false. lOB The Ninth Circuit scrutinized
each of the alleged defamatory statements to determine
whether the publications were defamatory or false or whether
they were protected under the RLA.109 As to the first and second statements, the Ninth Circuit classified them as rhetoriSee Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *29.
See id.
104 See id. at *30.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *31 (citing Linn u. United Plant
Guard Workers of Amer., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966». Employers covered under
the RLA are not subject to the provisions of the NLRA. See Konop, 2001 U.S. App.
Lexis 191, at *31. However, courts look to the NLRA and the cases interpreting it for
guidance in interpreting the RLA. See Brotherhood of Ry. 'Trainmen u. Jacksonuille
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969). The Ninth Circuit saw no reason not to apply
the rule regarding protected activities announced in Linn in the context of the RLA.
See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *31.
108 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *32. The allegedly defamatory statements included: (1) "Nobles does his 'dirty work ... like the Nazis during World War
II,' " (2) "Soviet Negotiating Style Essential to Nobles Plan!," (3) "Nobles is 'one incompetent at the top,' " (4) "Nobles 'has very little skill and little ability with people .
. . In fact, with as few skills as Nobles possesses, it is difficult to imagine how he got
this far,' " and (5) "Nobles Suspected in Fraud!" and "Hawaiian Air president, Bruce
Nobles, is the prime suspect in an alleged fraud which took place in 1991." See id. at
*32.
109 See id. at *32-35.
102
103
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cal hyperbole, which is protected under federal labor law. l1°
The third and fourth statements were classified as opinions,
which are also protected under federal law. 111 As to the last
statement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Hawaiian did not
show that Konop published it with knowledge of falsity.1l2 Absent a showing of malice, the Ninth Circuit determined that
Konop's publications were protected under the RLA.113

3. Specific Violations
After establishing that Konop's activities may constitute
protected organizing activity under the RLA, the Ninth Circuit addressed Konop's RLA claims.114 Konop alleged that Hawaiian had violated his rights under the RLA by (1) interfering with his organizing efforts through its unauthorized
access of his website, (2) wrongfully supporting one labor
group in favor of another by informing the ALPA of his website's content, and (3) engaging in coercion and intimidation
by threatening to sue him for defamation.115 Hawaiian argued
that Konop lacked sufficient evidence of these violations. 116
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.1 17

a. Access of website
Without legitimate justification, employers are prohibited
from engaging in surveillance of union organizing activities. 118
See id. at *32.
See id. at *32-33.
112 See id. at *34.
113 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *34.
114 See id. at *35.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36. Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act states that it is unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). In California Acrylic Industries v. NLRB, 150 F.3d
1095 (9th Cir. 1998) the Ninth Circuit explained that eavesdropping is generally prohibited because it has a tendency to "create fear among employees of future reprisals"
and it is this tendency, and not the actual chilling of protected activities, that therefore "chills an employee's freedom to exercise" rights under federal labor law. See Cal·
ifornia, 150 F.3d at 1099.
110

111
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Furthermore, labor law prohibits eavesdropping on a conversation between an employee and a union tepresentative. 119
Finding no distinction between eavesdropping on a conversation and the unauthorized viewing of an employee's secure
website, the Ninth Circuit determined that Konop had "raised
a material issue of triable fact" regarding Hawaiian's interference with Konop's union organizing activity.120

b. Disclosure to opposing union
Konop's second RLA claims alleged that Hawaiian had
improperly assisted an opposing labor faction by disclosing
the contents of Konop's website to Morella, the chairman of
ALPA.121 Under the RLA, an employer is prohibited from assisting one union faction over another.122 Although Hawaiian
argued that Konop had failed to present sufficient evidence
that Nobles had made such a disclosure or was even familiar
with the contents of Konop's website, the Ninth Circuit found
otherwise. 123
First, Morella stated that Nobles had contacted him regarding the contents of Konop's website.1 24 Second, Noble confirmed that he had contacted Morella concerning the effects
that Konop's "inaccurate attacks on the proposed labor agreements" would have on the ratification.125 As such, Nobles had
effectively conceded that he contacted Morella to help ensure
119 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36 (citing National Labor Relations
Board v. Unbelievable Inc., 71 F.3d 1434, 1435-39 (9th Cir. 1995) (in which the Ninth
Circuit found that an employer had violated the National Labor Relations Act by engaging in the unfair labor practices of eavesdropping on private conversations between employees and a union representative).
120 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36. The Ninth Circuit also rejected
Hawaiian's claim that its surveillance of Konop's website to correct false or misleading statements were justified under the RLA, the Wiretap Act, or the Stored Communications Act. See id. at *37. Nor did the Ninth Circuit accept Hawaiian's claim that
Davis' access to Konop's website did not violate the RLA because Konop did not appreciably limit his activities. See id. The Ninth Circuit found no authority to support
such a requirement. See id.
121 See id. at *38.
122 See id. at *39 (citing Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n., 897 F.2d 999, 1009
(9th Cir. 1990».
123 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *39-4l.
124 See id. at *39-40.
125 See id. at *40.
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that ALPA would prevail over Konop's opposing faction. 126 The
Ninth Circuit held that under these facts, Konop presented a
triable issue of fact on the issue of whether Hawaiian violated
the RLA by improperly providing assistance to ALPA.127

c. Threat of defamation suit
Konop's third RLA claim alleged that Nobles had engaged
in unlawful coercion and intimidation by threatening to sue
him for defamation. 128 An employer violates the RLA by filing
or threatening to file a lawsuit against an employee concerning union organizing activities. 129 Hawaiian argued that Konop failed to present sufficient evidence that Nobles had ever
threatened Konop with a lawsuit. 130 However, Morella had
stated, in his declaration, that Nobles advised him to caution
or inform Konop of the possibility of a defamation suit. 13l
Morella relayed Nobles' warning to Konop.132 Based on these
facts, the Ninth Circuit found that Konop had raised a triable
issue of fact that Nobles violated the RLA by engaging in coercion and intimidation by threatening Konop with a defamation suit. 133

4. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had
erred in granting summary judgment against Konop for his
RLA claims. 134 The Ninth Circuit determined that the court
had jurisdiction over the claims. 135 Furthermore, Konop had
raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether Konop's orSee id.
See id. at *40-41.
128 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41.
129 See id. (citing Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085, 1089-90
(9th Cir. 1995) (finding employer's defamation lawsuit against union violated 29
U.S.C. §159(a)(1»; Also citing GHR Energy Corp. v. NLRB, 924 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.
1991) (analyzing whether employer's threat to sue employee for defamation violated
NLRA». See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41.
130 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *41.
131 See id. at *42.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id. at *43.
135 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *42.
126

127
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ganizing activities were protected under the RLA and whether
Hawaiian had violated the RLA by: 1) accessing Konop's website, 2) disclosing its content to an opposing union faction, and
3) threatening to file suit against Konop.136
C. RETALIATION CLAIM

Konop claimed that his subpoenas for corroborating witnesses were improperly quashed, which caused the district
court to enter summary judgment against him in his claim
that Hawaiian had violated the RLA when it placed him on
sick leave in retaliation for the content of his website. 137 "A litigant whose subpoenas have been improperly quashed must
. . . show prejudice."138 While finding that a question exists
over whether the district court's remarks in a pretrial hearing
constituted an order to quash subpoenas, the Ninth Circuit
held that Konop had failed to show that he had been
prejudiced by any order quashing subpoenas. 139
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

Any person or company which maintains a website not
generally accessible to the public may benefit from this decision. Additionally, as the Ninth Circuit made no distinction
between eavesdropping and accessing a web site under false
pretenses, employers gaining unauthorized access to an employee's secure website in an attempt to interfere with organizing activities will violate both the RLA and the Wiretap
Act. 140 An employee's unauthorized access to or disclosure of
the content of an employer's secured website may also be considered Wiretap Act violations. 14l
The Ninth Circuit's requirements under the Wiretap and
Stored Communications Acts are relatively minimal. 142 To enSee id. at *42-43.
See id. at *42.
138 See id. at *43. See also Casino Foods Corp. v. Kraftco Corp., 546 F.2d 301, 302
(9th Cir. 1976).
139 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *43-44.
140 See Konop, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 191, at *36.
141 See Judy Greenwald, Lawyer's watching the airline case, Court expands wiretap law, Bus. Ins. at http://www.businessinsurance.com/archives/ (January 2001).
142 See id.
136

137
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sure protection from unlawful interception or access of content
on a secure website, web hosts should adhere to the following
guidelines: 1) limit the number and/or scope of intended
users,143 2) require user names and passwords,144 3) require
that all viewers accept the terms and conditions of use for the
website,145 4) the terms of use must include a non-disclosure
agreement. 146
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See id.
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